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In marking the 50th anniversary of Brady v. Maryland, a fitting way to appreciate the historic significance ofJustice Douglas’ opinion for the Court is to turn back the pages another 50 years. Brady’s profound contributionto the criminal justice system becomes apparent by considering the impoverished state of the Supreme Court’sdue process doctrine as it stood a century ago. In the 50 years that led up to Brady, the Court confronted a series
of racially and politically charged cases that forced constitutional soul searching about due process in the face of rank
injustice. The story of the Court’s fractious opinions in these dramatic cases — Frank v. Magnum, Moore v. Dempsey,
and Mooney v. Holohan— is thus the story of what made Brady’s soaring vision of justice and fairness both possible
and necessary.
Frank v. Magnum
This constitutional tale begins with an awful crime committed exactly one hundred years ago in Atlanta, Georgia.1
On April 27, 1913, a night watchman in the National Pencil Factory discovered the corpse of a factory employee named
Mary Phagan. Only 13 years old, Phagan had been brutally raped and murdered. The understandable public horror
surrounding this crime turned ugly after police arrested Leo M. Frank, the plant’s superintendant and part owner.
Critically, Frank was a Jew and Phagan a Christian. In the months leading up to Frank’s trial, sensational newspaper
coverage fanned anti-Semitic flames and caused tumult across the South.
Frank always proclaimed his innocence. However, Frank’s trial was conducted under a real threat of mob vio-
lence. A demonstrative crowd filled the courtroom each day. During closing arguments, thousands more nosily
gathered outside the courtroom. Newspaper editors warned the trial judge that this mob could erupt if the jury
acquitted Frank. The National Guard was called in and the judge openly discussed security arrangements with
Guard’s commander within sight of the jury. In this tense atmosphere, the jury unsurprisingly found Frank guilty.
The day after the jury’s verdict, the judge secretly convened the parties to avoid further rousing the public. He sen-
tenced Frank to hang until dead.
Frank’s defense team unsuccessfully sought a new trial and then appellate relief in the Georgia courts.
Rebuffed by state courts, Frank then petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of
Georgia. Upon denial, Frank turned at last to the U.S. Supreme Court. Before the Court, Frank’s argument focused
on the mob domination of his trial, which he alleged had denied him due process of law within the meaning of
the 14th Amendment. On April 19, 1915 — just shy of two years after Phagan’s murder — the Court decided Frank
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v. Magnum.2 A seven-justice majority
ruled against Frank and let his death
sentence stand.
Justice Pitney wrote the majority
opinion. His legal analysis fairly set out
the then-current state of due process
doctrine. Citing prior due process case
law, Pitney wrote: 
a criminal prosecution in the
courts of a state … conducted
according to the settled course
of judicial proceedings as
established by the law of the
state, so long as it includes
notice and an opportunity to
be heard, before a court of
competent jurisdiction,
according to the established
modes of procedure, is “due
process” in the constitutional
sense.3
Under this “notice and opportunity
to be heard” conception, Pitney reasoned
that Frank had received due process. 
The nub of Pitney’s argument
turned on the fact that Frank’s mob
domination claims had been heard and
rejected by the appellate and supreme
court in Georgia. “These proceedings,”
wrote Pitney, “are to be regarded as part
of the process of law under which he is
held in custody by the state.”4 Since the
Georgia appellate courts had conduct-
ed their subsequent review of Frank’s
case “under circumstances wholly apart
from the atmosphere of the trial, and
free from any suggestion of mob domi-
nation” before affirming the verdict,
Pitney concluded Frank had received
constitutional due process.5 To hold
otherwise, Pitney warned, would
improperly make due process doctrine
“impair the power of the states to
repress and punish crime.”6
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
dissented and was joined by future
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes.
Holmes’ powerful dissent would soon
help expand due process doctrine
beyond the narrow “notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard” conception
embraced by Pitney and the Court
majority. Relying on his own consider-
able authority rather than any prior
case law, Holmes wrote: 
Whatever disagreement there
may be as to the scope of the
phrase “due process of law,”
there can be no doubt that it
embraces the fundamental
conception of a fair trial. …
Mob law does not become due
process of law by securing the assent of a terrorized jury. We are not speaking
of mere disorder, or mere irregularities in procedure, but a case where the
processes of justice are actually subverted.7
Holmes thus advocated looking beyond the formal adequacy of state corrective
procedures and independently assessing whether substantive justice had been done.
“This is not a matter for polite presumptions,” warned Holmes. “We must look facts
in the face.”8
When Holmes looked facts in the face, he noted that “[a]ny judge who has sat
with juries knows that, in spite of forms, they are extremely likely to be impregnated
by the environing atmosphere.” Holmes concluded that Frank’s allegations support-
ed the conclusion that the jury responded to the passions of the mob, which meant
that the district court should have heard Frank’s petition. Closing in strong moral
language, Holmes declared it “our duty … to declare lynch law as little valid when
practised [sic] by a regularly drawn jury as when administered by one elected by a
mob intent on death.”9
Though Holmes failed to persuade the majority in Frank v. Magnum, his dis-
sent presciently apprehended the reality of mob violence and lynch law. After losing
in the Supreme Court, Frank’s lawyers managed to persuade Georgia’s governor to
commute Frank’s death sentence to life.10 Outraged anti-Semitic mobs subsequently
exploded into violence around the state. A month later, a party led by eminent citi-
zens abducted Frank from jail and then lynched him in Mary Phagan’s hometown.11
The horror of this injustice is compounded by the fact that Leo Frank was
almost certainly innocent. Seventy years after his lynching, the Georgia Board of
Pardons and Paroles granted him a posthumous pardon.12 The tragic Frank affair
had many consequences. The bitter anti-Semitism it provoked led to an unwelcome
revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the South. More positively, Frank case’s also inspired
the founding of Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith in 1913.13 And most impor-
tantly for this constitutional story, the Court’s failure to provide Leo Frank justice
helped push due process doctrine in a bold new direction. 
Moore v. Dempsey
Eight years after Frank v. Magnum, the Supreme Court confronted another case
of mob justice in Moore v. Dempsey.14 This time the violence arose out of a massive
race riot that occurred in 1919 in Philips County, Arkansas.15 The bloody riot lasted
days. Rampaging whites killed between 200 and 250 African-Americans before fed-
eral troops restored order. Four whites were also killed in the violence. In the after-
math, a series of grand jury indictments and hasty trials resulted in 79 convictions
of black men for the murder of the four whites. (Of course, no whites were even
indicted for murder.) Twelve men received death sentences. 
After a complicated path through Arkansas and federal courts, seven African-
American defendants all convicted of murdering the same man — Clinton Lee —
ended up in a consolidated habeas corpus appeal before the Court in Moore.16
Similar to Frank, the Moore defendants argued that they had been “hurried to con-
viction under the pressure of a mob without any regard for their rights and without
according them due process of law.”17 And as in Frank, the state authorities respond-
ed that the trials had followed the letter of the law and that state appellate processes
had found no problem. This time, however, the state’s argument failed. This time,
Justice Holmes wrote the seven-justice majority opinion and concluded that defen-
dants’ allegations of mob violence and intimidation stated a valid due process
claim.18
To support the proposition that mob domination contradicts due process,
Holmes cited no cases at all except for Frank. Specifically, Holmes seized upon
begrudging dicta from Pitney’s prior majority opinion that suggested a trial domi-
nated by a mob would violate due process if it caused an “actual interference with
the course of justice.”19 This questionable invocation of Frank incensed Justice
McReynolds. In a scathing dissent, McReynolds accused the Moore majority of put-
ting the real Frank doctrine aside and adopting “the views expressed by the minority
of the court in that cause.”20 To back up his claim, McReynolds quoted seven com-
plete paragraphs from Frank, which put Pitney’s mob-domination quote in its orig-
inal context.21
In truth, McReynolds accurately captured Holmes’ fast-and-loose approach to
precedent in Moore. Though he technically quoted the Frank majority, Holmes’
constitutional reasoning clearly followed his prior dissent. Holmes once again
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viewed due process as demanding an inquiry into the ends of justice rather than a
polite review of its means: 
[I]f it is the case that the whole proceeding is a mask — that counsel, jury, and
judge were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and
that State Courts failed to correct the wrong, neither perfection in the
machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel
saw no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent
this Court from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.22
On the other hand, McReynolds’ dissent in Moore faithfully echoed the central
themes of the Frank majority — the importance of deferring to state criminal
processes, confidence in the integrity of state-court review, and a general suspicion
of defendants’ claims. 
It should come as no surprise that Justice Holmes did not let the existence of
impoverished due process precedent stand in the way of his broader constitutional
vision. After all, Holmes had already penned that most famous aphorism critiquing
slavish adherence to precedent: “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”23 Holmes’ new doctrinal
approach also made good sense given the Frank debacle and the contemporary real-
ities of endemic racism and unchecked lynching. What’s more, Holmes’ ruling
directly helped the cause of justice on the ground. Two years after Moore, the men
(wrongly) convicted of killing Clinton Lee were all freed by a gubernatorial order.24
In terms of due process doctrine then, it is fair to say that Moore effectively
overruled Frank sub silentio. Moore showed that a trial dominated by a mob contra-
vened due process even if the state provided a formal corrective process complete
with notice and opportunity to be heard. Form alone was not enough to guarantee
substantive fairness. After Moore, the question became just how far this new think-
ing would go. 
The answer to that question is that Holmes’ new thinking ultimately led to Brady
and the recognition of a defendant’s right to discover exculpatory evidence. However,
before the Court was able to take that momentous step, due process doctrine first had
to expand to prohibit state subornation of perjury. This expansion occurred as a result
of the most prominent single doctrinal ancestor of Brady v. Maryland— the Court’s
unanimous 1935 per curiam opinion in Mooney v. Holohan.25
Mooney v. Holohan
Rather than race or religion, Mooney saw the Court confront a national contro-
versy involving political dissent. Tom Mooney was arrested in 1916 on a mass-mur-
der charge arising out of the bombing of a pro-war rally in San Francisco that had
killed nine people.26 A militant-left labor radical, Mooney had previously earned the
ire of local authorities — as well as that of the union-busting Pinkerton detective
agency — on account of his connection to a strike against a California utility com-
pany that had seen anonymous radicals blow-up sections of the utility’s power lines.
Mooney twice faced charges of possessing explosives and twice was acquitted at trial.
At the time of the San Francisco bombing, Mooney remained an outspoken indus-
trial unionist personally associated with famous anti-war anarchists such as
Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman. He was the perfect patsy for a set-up.
The team prosecuting Mooney for capital murder “put its evidence together out
of not much more than thin air.”27 The jury heard testimony, in all likelihood false
and perjured, placing Mooney at the scene of the grisly crime.28 Faced with this tes-
timony, the jury found Mooney guilty and he was sentenced to die. Yet after his con-
viction, the case against Mooney began to unravel. Evidence emerged that supported
suspicions about systematic perjury. Mooney’s case soon became an international
cause célèbre for the radical left. After decades of mass demonstrations and protract-
ed court battles, California Gov. Cuthbert Olson finally granted Mooney a full par-
don on innocence grounds in 1939.29
The Supreme Court’s 1935 opin-
ion in Mooney came four years before
Tom Mooney’s exoneration and actual-
ly played a very minor role in his
decades-long odyssey to prove his
innocence. Strictly speaking, Mooney
lost before the Court because the opin-
ion denied leave to file a habeas peti-
tion and directed Mooney to return to
the California courts.30 Nonetheless, the
Mooney opinion had enormous consti-
tutional significance as it both
advanced the new robust version of due
process doctrine and publically rejected
arguments of the California Attorney
General seeking to resurrect the earlier,
more impoverished, vision of the 14th
Amendment.
Mooney’s basic argument to the
Court was that the state’s procurement
and use of perjured testimony had vio-
lated his due process rights. In his
responsive brief, the California AG
countered that the “function of the
prosecuting attorney is to prosecute, to
act as an accuser, to be a partisan, to
present the evidence on one side of the
case.”31 Due process, the AG reasoned,
only demanded an “impartial [court]
between accuser and accused” and
could never be violated by a conviction
obtained through perjury unless “the
trial judge or trial jurors were parties to
the alleged fraud.”32 Relying on pre-
Moore case law, the AG asserted that
due process doctrine only required the
defendant to be given “notice and the
opportunity to be heard.”33 Since
Mooney had received such notice and
opportunity in state courts, the AG
characterized his quest for due process
relief as unsupported by precedent.
Thankfully, the Court was not per-
suaded. After summarizing the AG’s
due process arguments, the Supreme
Court’s per curiam opinion bluntly
rejected them: “we are unable to
approve of this narrow view of the
requirement of due process.”34 The
requirement of due process, the Court
wrote:
cannot be deemed to be satis-
fied by mere notice and hear-
ing if a state has contrived a
conviction through the pre-
tense of a trial which in truth
is but used as a means of
depriving a defendant
through a deliberate decep-
tion of court and jury by the
presentation of testimony
known to be perjured. Such a
contrivance by a state to pro-
cure the conviction and
Notice and hearing alone 
cannot deliver justice.
Brady
v.
Maryland
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imprisonment of a defendant
is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of jus-
tice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation.35
As authority for its substantive
conception of due process, the Court
cited Frank and Moore.36 However, the
Mooney court did not quote any specif-
ic rule from Frank or Moore and apply
it to the case before it. Rather, it analo-
gized to mob intimidation and the
“rudimentary demands of justice.” 
Mooney’s short and sweet analysis
had profound implications. Its due
process principle effectively authorized
federal review of the good faith of state
prosecuting attorneys. When prosecu-
tors acted in bad faith by suborning
perjury, they reduced procedural pro-
tections to an empty form. Notice and
hearing alone cannot deliver justice.
Mooney’s direct concern with substan-
tive justice consolidated the robust
understanding of due process advanced
by Holmes in his Frank dissent and
Moore majority. Mooney also spawned
a series of cases building upon its
logic.37 Brady v. Maryland is the crown-
ing achievement in this series. 
Brady v. Maryland
Decided on May 13, 1963, the
Brady Court announced its decision in
a six-justice majority opinion authored
by Justice Douglas. Recounting the
details of the fascinating case is unnecessary at this juncture as they are ably pre-
sented elsewhere in this anniversary issue of The Champion. For present purposes,
it suffices to note that before stating the holding of his opinion, Douglas clearly
acknowledged its doctrinal ancestry: “This ruling is an extension of Mooney.”38
Then followed the now legendary words:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material to either guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad
faith of the prosecution.39
This rule — finally providing discovery to defendants in criminal cases — was
the culmination of a half-century of doctrinal evolution forged in the fires of three
cases of religious, racial, and political injustice.
Without question, doctrinal purists could assail Douglas’ assertion that Brady
was a simple extension of Mooney. After all, it is quite a leap to infer an affirmative
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence from a case that imposed a negative prohibi-
tion on suborning perjury. It similarly stretches analogy to find a constitutional
basis for regulating discovery from cases that erected due-process protections
against mob justice. In short, it is a radical move to find precedent for the irrespec-
tive-of-good-or-bad-faith command of Brady in the tied-to-bad-faith history of its
ancestral cases discussed in this article. 
William Douglas, however, rejected such a timid view of constitutional prece-
dent. Like Holmes before him, Douglas could not brook blind adherence to the past
when it impeded necessary change for the present. Indeed, 14 years before he wrote
Brady, Douglas had proclaimed in a law review article that “[s]o far as constitution-
al law is concerned, stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component of
history.”40 Ultimately, it is this “dynamic component of history” that justifies
Douglas’ new due process rule in Brady.
By 1963, America looked very different from the way it had looked 50 years ear-
lier. After its historic mistake in Frank, the Court could not simply turn a blind eye
to the existence of criminal injustices rooted in religious, racial, or political preju-
dice. Of course, the Court’s opinions never spoke directly about such prejudices.
Doctrinal etiquette usually prevents Supreme Court justices from suggesting that
judges or juries could ever be bigoted or unfair. And yet, as Moore and Mooney
demonstrated, the Court progressively expanded due process doctrine to deal with
such ugly realities. By the time of Brady, due process doctrine had forward momen-
tum driven by concern for substantive justice. 
Fifty years later, the criminal justice system suffers its own ugly realities. We
could use some Brady momentum.
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